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Why and when suffering increases the perceived
likelihood of fortuitous rewards
How Hwee Ong* , Rob M. A. Nelissen and Ilja van Beest
Department of Social Psychology, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Cultural practices and anecdotal accounts suggest that people expect suffering to lead to
fortuitous rewards. To shed light on this illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association, we tested
why andwhen this effectmanifests. Across three vignette studies inwhichwemanipulated
the degree of suffering experienced by the protagonist, we tested a ‘just-world
maintenance’ explanation (suffering deserves to be compensated) and a ‘virtuous
suffering’ explanation (suffering indicates virtues, which will be rewarded). Our findings
revealed that the illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association (1) could serve as a way for
people to cope with just-world threats posed by the suffering of innocent victims, and (2)
manifested when the suffering was not caused by the victim’s own behaviour and not
readily attributable to bad luck. Taken together, these findings not only provide evidence
for the existence of the illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association but also elucidate its
psychological underpinnings.
Annually, in the early morning of May Day, students from the University of St Andrews
plunge into the freezing cold North Sea, supposedly because doing so will help them
obtain better grades in the upcoming examinations (University of St Andrews, 2019). A
similar notion that suffering will lead to subsequent rewards also seems to be reflected in
rituals that involve self-mortification. For example, some Catholics in Philippines
(Matsuzawa, 2015) and Taoists in Thailand (Mariani, 2014) self-inflict physical suffering
in hope that doing so will bring about positive outcomes such as good health and
prosperity.
The notion that suffering will result in a greater likelihood of attaining future
rewards is sometimes reasonable and well-warranted. For example, suffering victims
often do receive tangible help in the form of social welfare benefits and donations.
Suffering may also confer intangible psychological benefits such as enhanced self-
efficacy, competence (Bastian, Jetten, Hornsey, & Leknes, 2014), and perceived
meaning in life (Anderson, Kay, & Fitzsimons, 2010). However, in our current
research, we focus on ‘suffering–reward’ associations in situations that are illusory
(i.e., incompatible with the prevailing scientific understanding of cause and effect in
the natural world). We put forth and test two potential psychological explanations for
this association.
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One potential explanation (which we referred to as the ‘just-world maintenance’
explanation) is that the illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association may serve as an
effective way for people to maintain their belief in a just-world. People have a need to
believe that they are living in a world where people get what they deserve (Lerner,
1980). However, this belief could be threatened by the suffering of victims. Hence, to
cope with just-world threats, people may engage in a variety of coping strategies. One
such coping mechanism is immanent justice reasoning, which involves the attribution
of the victims’ suffering to prior moral misconduct. For example, people may causally
attribute natural disasters such as hurricanes and tsunami to prior moral misdeeds of
the victims. Attributions that are characteristic of such immanent justice reasoning are
generally incompatible with prevailing scientific understanding and therefore also
constitute illusory associations (Callan, Sutton, Harvey, & Dawtry, 2014). However,
whereas immanent justice reasoning is backward-looking, we propose that another
coping strategy may be to believe that the suffering of the innocent victim will be
compensated by illusory future rewards.
As such, our reasoning also shares much similarity with the concept of ultimate
justice reasoning, the view that injustices observed in the present are merely
temporary setbacks that will be compensated in the future (Maes, 1998). However,
existing research on ultimate justice reasoning has not provided clear evidence that
such forward-looking compensation can be illusory. For example, past research has
shown that people engage in ultimate just reasoning based on their responses on the
4-item Belief in Ultimate Justice scale (e.g., ‘In the long run, the injustice imposed by
illnesses receive appropriate reparation’) developed by Maes (1998). However, the
items in the scale were ambiguous with regard to the source of ultimate justice. That
is, terms such as ‘reparation’ may be interpreted as solely stemming from sources that
are well grounded in reality. Indeed, suffering victims often do receive tangible
donations. For example, victims of the large-scale Australian wildfires which started in
September 2019 received an outpouring of donations in the forms of money, food,
and clothes (Brown, 2020). Thus, endorsing items on the scale would not serve as
evidence of an illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association. Reparations or compensation
for suffering may also take the forms of intangible psychological rewards. Other
research investigating ultimate justice reasoning has shown that people expect
suffering to lead to non-tangible rewards such as meaning, fulfilment, and purpose in
life (Anderson et al., 2010; Harvey & Callan, 2014a, 2014b; Murayama & Miura, 2016).
However, these forms of psychological rewards might also be well grounded in
reality. For example, a study on residents from a town hit by tornado found that those
who experienced greater exposure to the tornado and suffered greater post-trauma
stress exhibited greater post-traumatic growth 2.5 years after the event (First, First,
Stevens, Mieseler, & Houston, 2018).
Our present research would therefore go beyond existing research by addressing
the open question as to whether people cope with just-world threats by expecting
that the victims will be subsequently compensated by illusory rewards. Specifically,
we focused on rewards that take the form of fortuitous outcomes that are based on
random chance (e.g., winning a lottery). In addition, we also tested another potential
association as to why people may hold illusory suffering–reward associations, one that
is not rooted in coping with just-world threats.
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‘Virtuous suffering’ explanation
Another potential explanation (which we referred to as the ‘virtuous suffering’
explanation) for the proposed illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association suggests that
experiencing sufferingmay improveperceivedmoral character,which is in turn expected
to bring about rewards. This explanation is derived by integrating two bodies of research
literature. First, Bastian et al. (2014) proposed that suffering may be indicative of virtues,
including those that are often associated with morality (e.g., heroism, bravery, humility).
In line with this idea, several studies found that self-punishment improves moral
perceptions of oneself and by third-party observers (Inbar, Pizarro, Gilovich, & Ariely,
2013; Nelissen, 2011; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Zhu et al., 2017). Second, the
enhanced moral perception may in turn be expected to bring about fortuitous rewards
through an expectation that the universe will reward moral individuals (Converse, Risen,
&Carter, 2012; Kulow&Kramer, 2016; Valenzuela, Bonezzi, & Szabo-Douat, 2018;White,
Norenzayan,& Schaller, 2018). As such, byproposing the ‘virtuous suffering’ explanation,
we also introduce a novel explanation for the illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association that
connects two largely disparate bodies of literature.
The current research
We conducted three experiments to investigate the existence and the psychological
underpinnings of the illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association. InExperiment1,weexplored if
the ‘virtuous suffering’ and ‘just-world maintenance’ mechanisms would account for the
illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association. In Experiment 2, we replicated the first experiment
and examined anopposingmechanism involving ‘bad luck attribution’. In Experiment 3,we
examined how the inferences from suffering vary across different sources of suffering. In all,
we found no support for the ‘virtuous suffering’ mechanism but obtained evidence for the
‘just-worldmaintenance’ and ‘bad luck attribution’mechanisms. The absenceof a zero-order
effect of suffering on reward likelihood in experiments 1 and 2 could reflect how the two
identified mechanisms working in opposing directions. Further evidence of this was
provided in Experiment 3, where we attenuated the ‘bad luck attribution’ mechanism and
found a zero-order effect where suffering increased perceived reward likelihood. Together,
these findings suggest that the illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association is dependent upon the
interplay of a ‘bad luck attribution’ and a ‘just-world maintenance’ mechanisms, both of
which are contingent on the causes of suffering.
The three experiments in this article are presented in the order in which they were
conducted. They received ethical approval from Tilburg School of Social and Behavioral
Sciences’s Ethics Review Board. The power analyses and results of additional analyses are
available in the Supporting Information. Preregistrations, study materials, data files, and
analysis scripts are available on the Open Science Framework.1
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 served as an initial test of the illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association.Wefirst
manipulated the degree of suffering experienced by the protagonist in a vignette and then
measured theperceived likelihood that the protagonistwould receive a fortuitous reward.
We further explored mediating effects of: (1) perceived moral character of the victim,
1 https://osf.io/5t47x/
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and (2) perceived deservingness to receive the reward. According to the ‘virtuous
suffering’ explanation, we should observe an indirect effect through perceived moral
character. If the illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association serves to maintain the belief in a
just-world by balancing out the suffering with future rewards, we should observe an
indirect effect through perceived deservingness.
While Lerner (1980) focused primarily on deservingness as a principle of justice (i.e.,
people get what they deserve), others emphasized another principle such as the need
principle (Montada, 1998). Therefore, we also explored perceived need as another
potential mediator that might also reflect the ‘just-world maintenance’ explanation (i.e., a
just-world is one where people get what they need).
Method
Participants
A total of 420 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers from United States participated in the
experiment. Fifty-one participants (12%) were excluded for failing the comprehension
check (a priori defined as answering less than three out of four comprehension check
questions correctly), leaving a valid sample size of 369 (Mage = 36.09, SDage = 11.38; 60%
males, 39% females, 1% other or prefer not to say).
Procedures and materials
Participants were first presented with a vignette introducing the protagonist’s situation
(see Table 1). Depending on their assigned conditions, participants read that the
protagonist (Diego, a person from Venezuela) is experiencing either a great deal of
suffering (high suffering condition) or relatively little suffering (low suffering condition).
Next, participants read that the protagonist is eligible for the ‘green card lottery’ and had
applied for it in hope of a better life. The lottery (formally known as the ‘diversity
immigrant visa’) is conducted annually to diversify the immigrant population in United
States by randomly selecting approximately 55,000 winners to receive permanent
residency status.2 Participants in our experiment were asked to estimate the likelihood
that the protagonist will win the lottery (from 0 to 100%). Next, as a manipulation check,
participants rated the amount of suffering the protagonist is experiencing on a 7-point
scale (1 = not at all; 7 = very much).
Participants then responded to three items measuring potential mediators on 7-point
scales. Specifically, to examine the ‘just-world maintenance’ explanation, they first rated
perceived need (‘How much do you think Diego needs to win the green card lottery?’;
1 = not at all, 7 = very much) and then deservingness (‘How much do you think Diego
deserves to win the green card lottery?’; 1 = not at all, 7 = very much). To examine the
‘virtuous suffering’ explanation, participants rated perceived moral character (‘How
moral do you think Diego is?’; 1 = notmoral at all, 7 = verymoral). As a comprehension
check, participants then answered four factual questions about the protagonist’s country
of origin, occupation, type of housing, and financial situation. For exploratory purposes,
2 The vignettes in our current set of experiments included some guiding information (e.g., participants were informed that 55,000
individuals are selected of the green card lottery) in order to reduce the variability in participants’ probability estimates. The
information provided is insufficient for participants to calculate the exact probability of receiving the positive outcome.
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we then administered the 7-itemGlobal Belief in a Just-World scale3 (GBJW; Lipkus, 1991).
Finally, participants provided information on age, gender, and political ideology.
Results
Manipulation check
Wewere successful inmanipulating the protagonist’s level of suffering. Participants in the
high suffering condition rated the protagonist as experiencing greater levels of suffering
(M = 5.83, SD = 1.19) than those in the low suffering condition (M = 2.90, SD = 1.59), t
(327) = 19.89, p < .001, d = 2.09, CI95% [1.84, 2.35].
Zero-order effects of suffering on reward likelihood
Suffering did not increase the perceived likelihood of fortuitous rewards. An independent
sample t-test indicated that participants in the high suffering condition (M = 14.26%;
SD = 19.97%) did not expect the protagonist to be more likely to win the green card
lottery compared to participants in the low suffering condition (M = 18.66%,
SD = 22.8%). Instead, there was a marginally significant effect in the opposite direction,
t(353) = 1.97, p = .050, d = 0.21, CI95% [0.00, 0.41].
Exploratory mediation analyses
To probe for potential mediation effects, we tested a mediation model with suffering as
the independent variable; perceived moral character, deservingness, and need as
concurrent mediators; and perceived likelihood of winning the lottery as the outcome
variable. Mediation analyses in this experiment were conducted using R package lavaan
Table 1. Vignettes used in Experiment 1
High suffering condition Low suffering condition
 Diego, a 24-year-old young adult living in a small
town inVenezuela, is oneof themany individuals
trying to leave Venezuela. Despite having a high
school education, Diego is unable to find stable
employment. He is homeless and often has to go
hungry due to the lack of money to buy food.
Living on the streets, he has been the victim of
several violent assaults. In hope of a better life,
Diego has applied for United States’ ‘green card
lottery’
 Diego, a 24-year-old young adult
living in a small town in Venezuela, is
one of the many individuals trying to
leave Venezuela. He owns and runs a
grocery store. Business at the store is
relatively good, and his earnings allow
him to live in amodern house and lead
a fairly comfortable lifestyle.
Nonetheless, in hope of a better life,
Diego has applied for United States’
‘green card lottery’
 The green card lottery, formally known as the diversity visa lottery, is intended to increase diversity in
immigration. Eligible applicants are randomly selected in the lottery to receive permanent residence
cards (green cards) that allow them to live and work in the United States. Approximately 55,000 green
cards are awarded every year. Diego is eligible and had applied for the green card lottery.
3 Results of moderated mediation analyses with GBJW and political ideology as moderators are reported in the Supporting
Information.
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version 0.6-3 (Rosseel, 2012) – standard errors were estimated with 5,000 bootstrap
draws. As seen in Figure 1, the indirect effect of suffering on the likelihood of winning
through deservingness was significant in the positive direction but the indirect effects
throughmoral character and need were not. This pattern of findings held up in additional
mediation analyses where each of the three mediators was included in separate models
(see Supporting Information).
Discussion
The result indicated that the level of suffering experienced by the protagonist did not
increase the perceived likelihood that the protagonist would receive a fortuitous reward
(i.e., winning the green card lottery). Nonetheless, even when zero-order effects are
absent, there may still be significant indirect effect(s). As an illustration, a researcher
interested in the effects of intelligence on task performance might observe no zero-order
effect (McFatter, 1979; Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011). However, there might
still be two opposing indirect effects. First, intelligence might be associated with greater
ability, which in turn led to better performance (i.e., intelligence ? greater ability ?
better performance). Second, intelligence might also have resulted in greater boredom,
which in turn led to poorer performance (i.e., intelligence? greater boredom?worse
performance). As such, the mere absence of a significant zero-order effect should not
prevent the further exploration of the psychological processes underlying a presumed
phenomenon (Rucker et al., 2011).
Indeed, in our experiment, we found a significant indirect effect through deserving-
ness that provided initial support for the ‘just-world maintenance’ explanation. The
presence of a significant indirect effectwithout a significant zero-order effectmay indicate
the presence of an overlooked opposing mechanism that was not included in the
mediationmodel (Zhao, Lynch,&Chen, 2010). However, our findings did not support the
‘virtuous suffering’ explanation. There was neither a significant indirect effect via









Direct effect: –4.73 (3.37), CI95% [–11.23, 1.92]
Total effect:–4.40 (2.23), CI95% [–8.71, –0.03]
IndirectDeserve effect:  2.72 (0.89), CI95% [1.14, 4.56]
IndirectMoral    effect: –0.10 (0.31), CI95% [–0.79, 0.53]











Figure 1. Results of mediation analysis with all three mediators concurrently. Unstandardized
coefficients shown with standard errors in parentheses. Solid line denotes significant path, while dashed
line denotes non-significant path.
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The results we obtained might have been influenced by some idiosyncratic aspects of
the vignette. As the participants were from United States, whether or not the protagonist
wins the green card lottery could be construed as being personally relevant to the
participants. That is, if the protagonist wins the green card lottery, he will be immigrating
to the participants’ country of residence. As homeless individuals might be perceived less
favourably and elicit more negative emotions such as contempt (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, &
Xu, 2002), participants in the high suffering condition who read that the protagonist is
homeless might prefer for the protagonist to notwin the lottery. This preference could in
turn lower the perceived likelihood that the protagonist would win the lottery due to
wishful thinking (also known as the desirability bias; Krizan & Windschitl, 2009). This
process could have contributed to the negative direct effect in our mediation models
where suffering reduced the perceived likelihood of winning the lottery. In our
subsequent experiments (experiments 2 and 3), this idiosyncrasy is circumvented as the
vignettes were written such that the outcomes of the protagonists were of no obvious
personal relevance to the participants.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 built upon the initial findings of Experiment 1 in several ways. First, we
examined an additional mechanism revolving around ‘bad luck attribution’ in which
suffering may also decrease the perceived likelihood of fortuitous rewards. To clarify,
certain conceptualizations of luck (i.e., ‘stable luck’) refer to luck as an internal
attribute of a person that it is relatively stable (Maltby, Day, Gill, Colley, & Wood,
2008). According to this view, an individual who is currently unlucky will continue to
be unlucky in the future. It might be the case that participants in Experiment 1 had
perceived the protagonist who is experiencing greater suffering to be unluckier and
that this unluckiness had translated to a lower perceived likelihood that he would
subsequently win the green card lottery. Second, we aimed to replicate our finding
which supported the ‘just-world maintenance’ explanation. Third, in order to examine
the robustness of the findings in Experiment 1 across different measurement methods,
we employed (1) an additional measure of reward likelihood, and (2) a more
comprehensive measure of moral character.
Method
Participants
A total of 539 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers from United States participated in the
experiment. Forty-seven (9%) participants were excluded for failing the comprehension
check (a priori defined as answering less than three out of four comprehension check
questions correctly), leaving a valid sample size of 492 (Mage = 36.43, SDage = 11.13; 53%
males, 46% females, 1% other or prefer not to say).
Procedures and materials
Participants were presented with a vignette shown in Table 2. Depending on their
assigned conditions, participants either read that the protagonist, a person with cleft lip
named Diego, is currently experiencing either a great deal of suffering (high suffering
condition) or not (low suffering condition). Next, participants read that the protagonist
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has been entered into a random draw to potentially receive free medical treatment for his
cleft lip. Participants were then asked to estimate the likelihood that the protagonist will
be selected in the random draw on (1) a percentage scale (from 0 to 100%) and (2) 7-point
scale (1 = very low chance to be selected, 7 = very high chance to be selected).
As a manipulation check, participants rated the degree of suffering the protagonist is
experiencing on a 7-point scale. Participants then responded to three items, each
measuring a potential mediator on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much): (1)
need (‘Howmuch do you think Diego needs the surgery?’ (2) deservingness (‘Howmuch
do you think Diego deserves to be selected for the surgery?’), and (3) unluckiness (‘How
unlucky do you think Diego is?’). Next, wemeasured perceivedmoral character using a 6-
item measure used in prior research (Goodwin, 2015; Landy, Piazza, & Goodwin, 2016).
Specifically, participants were asked to rate the protagonist on six traits (moral,
principled, honest, trustworthy, fair, and responsible) on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all,
7 = verymuch). Thismeasure exhibited good internal consistency reliability (a = .97) for
our sample.
As a comprehension check, participants answered four factual questions about the
protagonist’s country of origin, relationshipwith peers, usual mood, and theway patients
will be selected for the surgery. Participants then filled out the same GBJW scale (Lipkus,




Wewere successful inmanipulating the protagonist’s level of suffering. Participants in the
high suffering condition rated the protagonist as experiencing greater levels of suffering
(M = 5.84, SD = 1.07) than those in the low suffering condition (M = 3.46, SD = 1.45), t
(449) = 20.70, p < .001, d = 1.87, CI95% [1.66, 2.08].
Table 2. Vignettes used in Experiment 2
High suffering condition Low suffering condition
 Diego is a 14-year-old teen in Venezuelawith cleft lip. Cleft lip is a formof birth defectwhere a baby’s lip
does not form properly during pregnancy.
 Due to the lack of accessible health care in his country, Diego, like many others with the same
condition, was not able to receive treatment for his condition.
 Because of this medical condition,
Diego has been the target of
vicious bullying. He has no friends
and is beaten by the bullies from
time to time. He often feels anx-
ious, insecure, and lonely.
 Despite this medical condition, Diego
has a relatively healthy social envi-
ronment. He has several good friends
whom he frequently hangs out with.
He is usually cheerful and contended
with his life.
 Recently, it was announced that a volunteer medical team from abroad will be arriving in a nearby city
to offer free corrective surgery for patients with Diego’s condition. Diego is one of several hundred
applicants who signed up to receive the free treatment. However, due to the medical team’s limited
time and resources, they are only able to offer treatment to several dozen patients. The team therefore
decided to conduct random draws to decide who gets to receive the surgery.
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Zero-order effects of suffering on reward likelihood
As in Experiment 1, suffering did not increase the perceived likelihood of receiving
fortuitous rewards. Independent sample t-tests indicated that the participants in the high
and low suffering conditions did not significantly differ on both the percentage and
7-point measures of the perceived likelihood of fortuitous rewards (see Table 3).
Mediation analyses
To probe potential mediation effects, we first tested a mediation model, with suffering as
the independent variable; deservingness, need, moral character, and unluckiness as
concurrent mediators; and perceived reward likelihood as the outcome variable.
Mediation analyses in this experiment were conducted using R package lavaan version
0.6-3 (Rosseel, 2012) – standard errors were estimated with 5,000 bootstrap draws.
Results are shown in Figure 2. We found no significant indirect effect of suffering on
likelihood through need and moral character. We did, however, find a significant indirect
effect through unluckiness. That is, the protagonist who is experiencing higher level of
suffering was perceived to be unluckier, which was in turn associated with lower
perceived reward likelihood.
As in Experiment 1, we also found a positive indirect effect through deservingness that
was significant for the percentage measure of reward likelihood but only marginally
significant for the 7-point measure. We speculated that this marginally significant finding
might be due to a conceptual overlap between need and deservingness. As noted by
Preacher and Hayes (2008), correlated mediators can ‘compromise the significance of
particular indirect effects’ (p. 882). Thus, the relatively high correlation betweenneed and
deservingness in this experiment (r = .573, p < .001) could have attenuated the indirect
effect through deservingness. Further, prior research had also identified needperceptions
as an important factor that underlies deservingness judgement (Lamm&Schwinger, 1980;
Skitka & Tetlock, 1992; Taormina & Messick, 1983). Therefore, we reasoned that it may
not be statistically and theoretically sound to concurrently include deservingness and
need in the same mediation model. Indeed, excluding need perception as a mediator
resulted in significant indirect effects through deservingness and unluckiness for both
measures of rewards likelihood (see Figure 3).4
Table 3. Comparison of the perceived likelihood of reward across conditions
Dependent variable
Condition t-test statistics
High suffering Low suffering t p d CI95%
Likelihood (percentage) M = 27.97 %
SD = 21.08 %
M = 26.42 %
SD = 20.29 %
t(490) = 0.83 .408 0.07 [0.10, 0.25]




t(490) = 0.02 .982 0.00 [0.18, 0.18]
4We had also tested additional mediation models where each of the four mediators was included in separate models. Briefly, we
found evidence for indirect effects through deservingness and need in the positive directions, and through unluckiness in the
negative direction (see Supporting Information for details).









Direct effect: 1.17 (2.13), CI95% [–
–
2.94, 5.49]
Total effect: 1.55 (1.95), CI95% [–2.21, 5.44]
IndirectDeserve effect:  1.02 (0.56),  CI95% [0.01, 2.14]
IndirectMoral    effect: –0.23 (0.25), CI95% [–0.80, 0.21]
IndirectNeed      effect:  1.23 (0.81), CI95% [–0.22, 2.94]
IndirectUnlucky effect: –1.64 (0.60), CI95% [–2.94, –0.55]























Total effect: 0.00 (0.12), CI95% [–0.23, 0.23]
IndirectDeserve effect:  0.06 (0.04),  CI95% [–0.01, 0.15]
IndirectMoral    effect: –0.01 (0.02), CI95% [–0.04, 0.02]
IndirectNeed      effect:  0.07 (0.06), CI95% [–0.03, 0.19]
IndirectUnlucky effect: –0.13 (0.04), CI95% [–0.21, –0.06]


















Figure 2. Results of mediation analyses with all four mediators concurrently with (a) percentage
measure of reward likelihood and (b) 7-point measure of reward likelihood. Unstandardized coefficients
shown with standard errors in parentheses. Solid line denotes significant path, while dashed line denotes
non-significant path.
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Discussion
The findings in this experiment are consistent with those of Experiment 1. While our
suffering manipulation had no zero-order effect on reward likelihood, we found the same
mediating effect of deservingness where individuals who experienced greater levels of
suffering were perceived to be more deserving of future rewards, which was in turn
associated with a higher likelihood of fortuitous rewards. As before, our findings did not









Direct effect: 1.98 (1.99), CI95% [–
–
1.88, 5.96]
Total effect: 1.55 (1.91), CI95% [–2.21, 5.28]
IndirectDeserve effect:  1.38 (0.52),  CI95% [0.41, 2.47]
IndirectMoral    effect: –0.27 (0.26), CI95% [–0.88, 0.11]






















Total effect: 0.00 (0.12), CI95% [–0.23, 0.24]
IndirectDeserve effect:  0.09 (0.03),  CI95% [0.03, 0.16]
IndirectMoral    effect: –0.01 (0.02), CI95% [–0.04, 0.02]













Figure 3. Results of mediation analyses with deservingness, moral character, and unluckiness as
concurrent mediators. Reward likelihood is measured on a (a) percentage measure and (b) 7-point
measure. Unstandardized coefficients shown with standard errors in parentheses. Solid line denotes
significant path, while dashed line denotes non-significant path.
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attribution’ explanation,we found amediating effect throughunluckiness. That is, people
perceived individuals who experienced greater levels of suffering to be unluckier and this
unluckiness was in turn associated with a lower likelihood of fortuitous rewards.
EXPERIMENT 3
In Experiment 2, we found evidence for two competing psychological mechanisms that
might underlie the illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association, albeit in opposing directions,
namely (1) a ‘just-world maintenance’ mechanism that increases the perceived reward
likelihood, and (2) a ‘bad luck attribution’ mechanism that decreases the perceived
reward likelihood. In Experiment 3, we aimed to corroborate and build upon these
findings by examining how the interplay of these two competingmechanisms varies with
different causes of suffering.
We differentiated between three types of causes: (1) other individuals, (2) the self, and
(3) stochastic processes. We reasoned that when there is an obvious cause for the
suffering, such as it being clearly attributable to other individuals or the self, people are
less likely to attribute the suffering to bad luck, thereby attenuating the ‘bad luck
attribution’ mechanism. In addition, we expected that the ‘just-world maintenance’
mechanismwould be attenuatedwhen suffering is perceived to be deserved (e.g., when it
is caused by oneself).
The above reasonings led us to make several predictions regarding the indirect effects
through deservingness and unluckiness for each of the three causes of suffering (see also
Table 4 for an overview). First, when suffering is caused by other individuals and
perceived as undeserved, we expected the ‘bad luck attribution’ mechanism, but not the
‘just-world maintenance’ mechanism, to be attenuated. Second, when suffering is caused
by oneself, we also expected the ‘bad luck attribution’mechanism to be attenuated due to
the presence of a clear cause. Because the suffering resulted fromone’s owndecisions and
behaviour, the victim is likely to beperceived as being responsible for and deserving of the
suffering. This is expected to pose minimal threats to just-world beliefs, thereby
attenuating the ‘just-world maintenance’ mechanism. Third, when undeserved suffering
is the result of stochastic (i.e., random) processes, we expected that neither the ‘bad luck
attribution’ nor the ‘just-world maintenance’ mechanisms would be attenuated.
As the two mechanisms were expected to act in opposite directions, the zero-order
order effect of suffering on reward likelihood should reflect the aggregation of both
indirect effects (see Table 4). Thus, we predicted that a positive zero-order effect would
emerge only when suffering is caused by others. While different patterns of indirect
effects were expected for suffering caused by the self and stochastic processes, we
predicted that both forms of suffering would exert weak or no zero-order effect.
Table 4. Overview of the predictions for various causes of suffering
Cause of suffering
Strength of mechanism






Other individuals Stronger Weaker Positive
Self Weaker Weaker Weak or absent
Stochastic processes Stronger Stronger Weak or absent
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Method
Using a between-subject design, we manipulated the cause of suffering experienced by
the protagonist in a vignette. Participants read that the protagonist either experienced
suffering caused by another individual (other condition), caused by the self (self-
condition), resulting from stochastic processes (stochastic condition), or did not
experience suffering (control condition). Participants then estimated the likelihood that
the protagonist will subsequently experience a positive fortuitous outcome.
Participants
A total of 1,619 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers from United States participated in the
experiment. Ninety-five participants (5.8%) were excluded for failing the comprehension
check (a priori defined as answering less than two out of three comprehension check
questions correctly), leaving a valid sample size of 1,524 (Mage = 36.08, SDage = 11.71;
49.9% males, 49.5% females, 0.6% other or prefer not to say).
Procedures
Participants were presented with the vignette (see Table 5) selected from a pre-test (see
Supporting Information for information on the pre-test). The protagonist in this vignette is
a university student majoring in French. Depending on the participants’ assigned
conditions, they either read that the protagonist is experiencing suffering (i.e., limb
amputation) that was caused by another individual (other condition), caused by his own
decision (self-condition), the result of stochastic processes (stochastic condition), or is
not experiencing suffering (control condition). Next, participants read that the
protagonist had applied for a study abroad programme in France but that it was
oversubscribed, and that the vacancies will be allocated via a random draw. Participants
then estimated the likelihood that the protagonist will be selected for the study abroad
programme on the 7-point measure (1 = very low chance, 7 = very high chance).
Next, participants rated the protagonist’s deservingness to be selected for study
abroad programme (1 = not at all, 7 = verymuch) and howunlucky he is (1 = not at all,
7 = extremely). Theperceivedmoral character of theprotagonistwasmeasured using the
same 6-item measure used in Experiment 2. This measure exhibited good internal
consistency reliability (a = .95) for our sample. As a manipulation check, participants
rated the degree of suffering the protagonist is experiencing (1 = not at all, 7 = very
much). As a comprehension check, participants answered three factual questions about
the vignette. Finally, participants provided demographic information (i.e., age and
gender).
Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics of the key variables are presented in Table 6.
Manipulation check
We were successful in manipulating the protagonist’s level of suffering. The perceived
suffering experienced by the protagonist was significantly higher in the three suffering
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conditions (Ms ranging from 5.46 to 5.86) as compared to the control condition
(M = 2.68), all ps < .001.
Zero-order effects of suffering on reward likelihood
Participants in the four conditions differed in the perceived likelihood of fortuitous
rewards. An one-way ANOVA indicated that reward likelihood differed across the four
conditions, F(3, 1,520) = 7.33, p < .001, g2 = .014, CI95% [0.004, 0.028]. Results of the
corresponding pairwise t-tests are shown in Table 7. As predicted, we found that the
perceived reward likelihood in the other condition was higher than that in the control
condition. Contrary to our prediction, the perceived reward likelihood in the stochastic
condition was also higher than that of the control condition. Perceived reward likelihood
did not significantly differ between the control and self-conditions.
Mediation analyses
We tested a mediation model with (1) experimental condition as a multinomial
independent variable (with control condition as the reference group), (2) deservingness,
unluckiness, and moral character as concurrent mediating variables, and (3) perceived
reward likelihood as the outcome variable. Themediationmodel was testedwith jamovi’s
jAMM module5 (The jamovi project, 2019) using the bootstrap (percentile) method with
5,000 draws to estimate the standard errors. Results are shown in Table 8. As in
experiments 1 and 2, we did not find support for the ‘virtuous suffering’ explanation. We
now turn to examine support for our predictions relating to the mechanisms involving
‘just-world maintenance’ and ‘bad luck attribution’.
Other-caused suffering
We predicted that when suffering was caused by another individual, we would observe a
significant positive indirect effect through deservingness and no or weak indirect effect
through unluckiness. These two predictions were supported (see Table 8).
Table 6. Means and standard deviations of key variables in Experiment 3
Variable
Condition
Control Other Self Stochastic
Reward likelihood 3.81 (1.29) 4.02 (1.40) 3.73 (1.23) 4.11 (1.35)
Deserve 5.31 (1.16) 5.51 (1.19) 4.70 (1.34) 5.33 (1.26)
Moral 5.10 (0.98) 5.22 (1.08) 4.04 (1.15) 5.12 (0.99)
Unlucky 3.29 (1.13) 4.47 (1.48) 3.59 (1.47) 4.60 (1.54)
Suffering 2.68 (1.39) 5.86 (1.00) 5.46 (1.19) 5.64 (1.17)
Note. Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. Variables were measured on a 1- to
7-point scale.
5 jamovi’s jAMM module also utilizes the R package lavaan to estimate mediation models. We used jamovi in Experiment 3
because it provides a graphical user interfacewhichwe believe would reduce inadvertent errors when specifying relatively complex
mediation model.
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Self-caused suffering
We predicted that when suffering was caused by oneself, the indirect effect through
deservingness would not be significant. Contrary to our prediction, we found such an
indirect effect in the negative direction: suffering decreased deservingness, whichwas in
turn positively associated with perceived reward likelihood. As predicted, there was no
significant indirect effect through unluckiness.
Stochastic suffering
We had predicted significant indirect effects through deservingness and unluckiness.
However, contrary to our predictions, both indirect effects were not significant. We did,
however, observe a positive zero-order effect, suggesting that there could be other
mechanism(s) at work.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We set out to find formal empirical support for an illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association
and to examine the underlying mechanisms and the conditions of its occurrence. Across
three experiments with different operationalizations of suffering, we tested three
psychological mechanisms. The first mechanism, which we termed ‘virtuous suffering’,
draws on and connects two largely disparate bodies of research. One body of researchwas
based on the notion that experiencing suffering would lead the victim to be perceived as
moremoral (Bastian et al., 2014). The enhancedmoral charactermight in turn result in the
victim being perceived as more likely to receive fortuitous rewards through the tendency
to expect good things to happen to good people (White et al., 2018). However, our
findings did not support this explanation. Across all three experiments, perceived moral
character did not mediate the effects of suffering on reward likelihood as would be
expected by this explanation.
On the other hand,we found support forwhatwe termed the ‘just-worldmaintenance’
explanation. This explanation was based on prior work suggesting that people have a
need to believe that the world is just and that this need would be threatened by
undeserved suffering in the world (Lerner, 1980). We proposed that expecting suffering
to be subsequently compensated by fortuitous rewards could serve as an alternative way
for people to mitigate just-world threats. Across all three experiments, we found that
perceived deservingness mediated the effects of suffering on reward likelihood. That is,
suffering victims were perceived as more deserving of future reward and this increased
deservingness was in turn associated with a greater perceived likelihood to actually
Table 7. Results of pairwise t-tests comparing the perceived reward likelihood in the three suffering
conditions with that in the control condition
Comparison
t-test statistics
t df p d CI95%
Other versus control 2.07 688 .039 0.16 [0.01, 0.30]
Stochastic versus control 3.24 782 .001 0.23 [0.09, 0.37]
Self versus control 0.89 765 .373 0.06 [0.21, 0.08]
Note. These statistics were based on non-pooled variance, but using pooled variance led to the same
pattern of results.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Suffering and fortuitous rewards 17
receive the reward. Because this explanation hinges upon suffering posing a just-world
threat, we reasoned that this effect ought to be absent when suffering was caused by
oneself as the suffering would be perceived as deserved and not pose any just-world
threat. This reasoning was supported by the results of Experiment 3.
Ourfindings therefore contribute towards ourunderstandingof howpeople copewith
just-world threats by going beyond commonly studied coping strategies such as victim-
blaming and victim-derogation (Lerner, 1980). It also lends support to the notion that
people can cope with just-world threats by engaging in ultimate justice reasoning (i.e.,
thinkingthatpresent injusticeswillbecompensatedinthefuture).Whilepreviousresearch
did not provide clear evidence that the compensation in ultimate justice reasoning can be
illusory, our findings fill this voidbydemonstrating that peoplemay expect injustices (e.g.,
undeserved suffering) to be compensated by future illusory rewards.
Our experiments had largely focused on situations where suffering is compensated
with rewards that directly address the suffering. For example, winning the green card
lottery could alleviate the suffering of a homeless individual, just as corrective surgery for
cleft lip would for a patient with the medical condition. We propose that these forms of
‘within-domain’ effects where the reward befits the suffering could be the most
prototypical examples of justice being served. As such,we expect ‘within-domain’ effects
to be most pronounced. Nonetheless, our third experiment where a misfortune in the
health domain (i.e., limb amputation) could be compensated by a reward in the education
domain (i.e., selected for study abroad programme) appears to provide some evidence of
cross-domain effects. Our findings also established the presence of another mechanism
involving ‘bad luck attribution’. According to this explanation, victims of suffering might
be perceived to be unluckier and this perceived bad luck could then translate to a lower
perceived likelihood of obtaining fortuitous rewards. Consistent with this explanation,
we found in Experiment 2 that suffering decreased the perceived likelihood of fortuitous
rewards through unluckiness. We further predicted that this mechanism would be
attenuated when suffering had a clear cause (e.g., caused by the self or others). This
prediction was bore out in Experiment 3, lending further support to this explanation.
Our research also provided insights on suffering that resulted from stochastic
processes. In Experiment 3, we found that this form of suffering increased the perceived
likelihood of fortuitous rewards. Intriguingly, while this indicated the presence of the
illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association, mediation analyses indicated that this zero-order
effect was not explained by any of the three above-mentioned mechanisms. While the
underlyingmechanism(s) remains anopenquestion,wepropose that a possible candidate
is a mechanism similar to that which underlies the gambler’s fallacy (Burns & Corpus,
2004). Akin to the tendency to fallaciously believe that a ‘head’ on a fair coin toss is more
likely to be followed by a ‘tail’, people may construe stochastic life outcomes in a similar
manner and expect positive fortuitous events (e.g., getting selected for the exchange
programme) to bemore probable after negative events (e.g., losing limb due to stochastic
processes). Crucially, such a mechanism would speak to a more general phenomenon
than our present focus on the illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association, reflecting how
people perceive randomness and chance in everyday life.
Beyond illuminating the underlying mechanisms of the illusory ‘suffering–reward’
association, our findings also highlight the importance of looking beyond zero-order
effects. As pointed out by Rucker et al. (2011), focusing solely on zero-order effects may
‘cause researchers to miss theorized relationships that are present in the data’ (p. 368).
Given the complexity of the human psyche, it should come as no surprise that a multi-
faceted psychological construct such as suffering can influence judgement throughmore
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than one mechanism. Indeed, the examination of mediating effects offered a better
appreciation of how the illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association reflects the interplay of
two opposing psychological mechanisms.
Limitations
Inherently, amediationmodel only tests one of several possible causal models and cannot
rule out reverse mediation models (Fiedler, Schott, & Meiser, 2011; Thoemmes, 2015).
Nonetheless, we believe that our interpretation of the findings is strengthened by our
findings in Experiment 3 where the indirect effect through deservingness varied across
different causes of suffering in a theoretically expected manner (i.e., the indirect effect
was absent when suffering was self-caused). Deservingness, as a mediator, also differed
across the causes of suffering (e.g., deservingness was lower when suffering was caused
by oneself). This systematic variation of the mediator would allay concerns regarding
confounding in mediation analysis (Rohrer, 2019).
While our results did not provide support for the ‘virtuous suffering’ mechanism, we
acknowledge that we cannot rule out the possibility that this mechanism may emerge
under other condition(s). For instance, suffering may improve perceived moral character
when it is exceptionally severe, experienced in the pursuit of a worthy cause, or when it
has been successfully overcome.
While we had focused on testing the ‘virtuous suffering’ and ‘just-world maintenance’
explanations, a more complex explanation that is a hybrid of the two may nonetheless
remain theoretically plausible. Specifically, suffering could have enhanced moral charac-
ter, which would in turn increase perceived deservingness and subsequently reward
likelihood (i.e., a serial mediationmodel: suffering?moral character? deservingness?
reward likelihood).However, this explanationwasnotborneoutbyour results as suffering
did not enhance perceived moral character in any of the three experiments.
The participants in all three experiments were Amazon’s Mechanical Turk workers
from United States. While the generalizability of our findings beyond Americans remains
undemonstrated, we believe that the fact that we found support for our key finding
regarding ‘just-world maintenance’ in samples with relatively strong meritocratic beliefs
and individualistic values that emphasizes personal responsibilities presents a strong case
that itwould generalize to other cultures. Despite a possible inclination to hold individuals
responsible and accountable for their negative outcomes and causally attribute suffering
to the victims, we nonetheless found support for the illusory ‘suffering–reward’
association, suggesting that the association could be even more prominent in cultures
with less emphasis on personal responsibility.
Implications and future directions
We often rely on our forecasts of future outcomes when making decisions. Thus, when
forecasts about an individual’s outcome are influenced by the degree of suffering
experienced by the individual, sub-optimal decision-making might ensue. Our current
research thus paves theway for future research to investigate potential implications of the
illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association. For example, if people expect that their personal
suffering would be compensated in implausible ways, they may be unrealistically
optimistic in their forecasts and thus engage inmaladaptive risky behaviour (e.g., financial
investment, dangerous stunts). Another potential implication is its effects on helping
behaviour. If people expect suffering victims to be compensated in the absence of any
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such indication, this ‘everything will be okay’ mentality might lead to a reduced tendency
to personally render aid.
Conclusion
Our research furthers our understanding of why and when people may hold an illusory
‘suffering–reward’ association. We found that the illusory association results from the
interplay of two opposing psychological mechanisms. The first, which involves the
tendency to expect suffering to be compensated in unwarranted ways, manifests when
suffering is undeserved. The other, which involves the attribution of suffering to bad luck,
emerges when there is no obvious cause to the suffering.
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